The secular repressive pattern in Islam follows the French Revolution and is a rival to the Iranian Revolution in its low levels of religious freedom. Most practitioners of the secular repressive pattern have been authoritarian rulers: Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, Syria’s Assads. It is often through brutal force, including torture, that they restrict religion—and necessarily so because their populations are far more religious than they are.
From a satellite view, the Muslim world does not look religiously free. The picture seems to favor the view that I have called “Islamoskepticism.” Of 47 Muslim-majority states, 36, or almost three-quarters, have “high” or “very high” levels of religious repression according to the standards of the Pew Research Center.
When we zoom in closer, however, the picture is more diverse and does not so easily favor the Islamoskeptics.
My new book, Religious Freedom in Islam: The Fate of a Universal Human Right in the Muslim World Today, assesses the West’s culture war over Islam through the criterion of religious freedom. The problem is that religious freedom itself has been the subject of a public contretemps in recent years.
This controversy is of recent vintage and beset with amnesia.
A culture war over Islam has been raging in the West at least as far back as the attacks of September 11th, 2001. It flares up every time terrorist acts or other forms of violence involving Muslims hit the headlines. Much as in the Cold War, this public debate has hawks and doves, which I will call “Islamoskeptics” and “Islamopluralists,” respectively.
Who is right? That is the question that Religious Freedom in Islam seeks to answer. Its criterion is religious freedom. More demanding than tolerance or even democracy, religious freedom requires enduring respect for the religious beliefs and practices of the person or community who differs over the ultimate questions of life, respect for everyone’s full and equal citizenship regardless of his or her religious beliefs, and a rejection of all heavy forms of discrimination.
By Minhas Majeed Khan
The creation of Pakistan in 1947 brought hopes not only to Muslims but also to religious minorities. The founding father, Quaid–e–Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, envisioned a state that represents all communities in policy making. For Jinnah the spirit of nationhood [National Identity] was to live in unity, that is, each individual ceasing their faiths whether Hindu, Christian, Sikh or Muslim. Not in a religious sense, because that is their personal faith [Religious Identity], but in a political sense as the citizen of the state [National identity]. Unfortunately, after his death, his predecessors deviated from the ideology he defined.